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Large-scale information technology (IT) projects experience higher failure rates than smaller IT projects.  When these 
projects fail in government agencies, they represent significant costs to both the agencies and society.  This paper reports the 
results of a study on large-scale government IT projects that failed over multiple iterations.  Data was gathered on the 
modernization efforts at the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) from publicly available documents spanning over 30 years of 
project history.  The inductive techniques used both confirm and extend prior literature to suggest that while existing theories 
can help explain cyclical patterns of escalating and withdrawing commitment, there are clear organizational determinants that 
play a role in this process.  In particular we discuss the role of strategic factors, emerging project characteristics, and 
organizational capabilities for project management and systems development in government IT projects.   
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INTRODUCTION 
Each year organizations around the world, both public and private, spend a combined total of billions to trillions of 
dollars implementing information systems. Large-scale IT projects are notoriously difficult to control, with reported failure 
rates that exceed 50 to 75 percent (CSTB, 2000; Standish Group, 1994).  These high failure rates are of concern in public 
sector organizations because government agencies are increasingly pursuing large-scale IT projects as seen by the increase in 
data warehousing, e-government, and system integration projects over the past decade.  Unfortunately, our understanding of 
the challenges facing large-scale IT projects, or how to resolve them, is somewhat limited as the research on large-scale 
systems is insufficiently broad, both in theoretical understanding and methodological approaches (CSTB, 2000).  From the 
high failure rate of these projects, we can identify the need to develop theories and frameworks that address issues specific to 
the management of large-scale IT projects.   
While IT projects are more likely to escalate than other projects in general (Keil and Mann, 1997), because large-scale 
projects require significant resource commitment and are driven by a strategic need, they are perhaps more likely to escalate 
than other IT projects.  Drawing from evidence provided by Newman and Sabherwal (1996) and Drummond (1994), we 
believe that a common characteristic of many of these failed large-scale IT projects is that they tend to experience multiple 
cycles of escalating and de-escalating commitment, and then due to the persistence of organizational factors are redirected, 
only to escalate again.  However, there are still unanswered questions regarding some of the dynamics involved among the 
determinants of escalation over time as they relate to large-scale IT projects.   
The purpose of this paper is to explore the emergence of organizational determinants of escalation and identify if and 
how they influence large-scale government IT projects to repeatedly fail.  To address these questions this paper uses a 
longitudinal field study based upon historical data from the modernization efforts at the United States Internal Revenue 
Service (IRS).  The IRS modernization efforts and similar projects in other federal agencies provide rare opportunities to 
study large-scale IT projects over time as they are accompanied by substantive documentation and analysis available for 
public review.  Over the 30-year period examined, the IRS efforts to modernize failed repeatedly.  These attempts at 
modernization experienced multiple cycles of escalation, de-escalation, redirection and re-escalation even though individual 
actors changed.  These characteristics of the IRS case allow us learn about why and how redirected large-scale projects 
persist and re-escalate through multiple iterations.  The case characteristics also provide the opportunity to identify 
organizational determinants of escalation.  
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BACKGROUND 
When discussing large-scale systems implementation, there are a variety of definitions for “large-scale.”  This variety 
stems from the difficulty in establishing a single variable or limited set of variables that define “largeness” in general 
(Brussard, 1992; Zmud, 1980).  Zmud (1980:15) defined a large-scale system “to be one that requires more than one 
management level to coordinate the development effort, and more than a six month development period.”  Sundgren (1986) 
suggested that largeness could be measured by the amount of information that is available in the system and the amount of 
information processing that is going on in the system.  The Standish Group (1994) suggests that any system development 
project costing over $10 million is large-scale.  Combining these approaches, we define large-scale systems by the degree of 
complexity involved in terms of the size of the information sets and machine programs, and the amount of management 
resources required to implement the system.  
Escalation, De-escalation, and Re-escalation 
The processes of escalation and de-escalation of commitment present a useful theoretical perspective from which to 
study large-scale IT project failure (Keil, 1995); particularly since IT projects may be more susceptible to these phenomena 
than other types of projects (Keil and Mann, 1997; Zmud, 1980).  Traditionally, escalation theory focuses on the continued 
commitment to a previously chosen course of action in spite of negative feedback concerning the viability of that course of 
action (Keil, Mann and Rai, 2000), whereas de-escalation theory focuses on the factors or processes by which commitment to 
a previous course of action is reduced (Keil and Robey, 1999).  There are several documented cases of escalation occurring in 
large-scale IT projects (see, for example, Montealegre and Keil, 2000, Newman and Sabherwal, 1996; Flowers, 1996).  Most 
of these studies examined only the escalation process (e.g., Keil, Mixon, Saarinen and Tuunainen, 1994-1995) or the de-
escalation process (e.g., Garland, 1990; Montealegre and Keil, 2000).  A notable exception is the longitudinal analysis of a 
large-scale IT project at Centco that repeatedly failed (Newman and Sabherwal, 1996).  That study demonstrated that cycles 
of escalation and de-escalation can occur repeatedly over the lifetime of a project.  In doing so, they found the dynamics 
among escalation determinants to be different from much of the prior research.   
When long-term, large-scale IT projects that involve high levels of investment are redirected, conditions exist that may 
produce multiple cycles of escalation and de-escalation (Montealegre and Keil, 2000).  Supporting this notion, Drummond 
(1994) found that escalation of commitment is different in situations where individuals inherit unsuccessful and long-running 
projects, and that such situations experience a cyclical escalation effect.  However, Drummond’s study was not conducted in 
an IT-project context.  Newman and Sabherwal (1996) provide perhaps the best evidence as to what happens to these projects 
over multiple decision points.  In their study they used data from Centco to demonstrate how determinants of commitment 
among individuals shift from escalation to withdrawal of commitment and back over time.  These latter two studies 
demonstrated that escalation and withdrawal of commitment share a more complicated and dynamic relationship over time 
and provide the theoretical underpinning for the concept of re-escalation cycles used in this paper.   
Organizational versus Individual Determinants 
The literature has now evolved to the point where we must seriously consider the possibility that escalation results from 
the combination of many different interacting factors, which includes the role of organizational factors (Staw, 1997).  There 
are actions and decisions made by organizations that can not be attributed to specific individuals because they result from 
interactions among individuals and may represent factors institutionalized or embedded in an organization.  Increasingly 
decisions in organizations are made by multiple individuals in order to reduce biases or risks inherent in individual decision 
making (Applebaum and Batt, 1994; Cianni and Wnuck, 1997).  Top managers rarely act alone and many decisions are 
typically made in team structures (Hambrick and Mason, 1984).  This makes it difficult to attach the failure of long-term, 
large-scale projects to the decisions of specific individuals.  In fact, the pressures to escalate in long-term established projects, 
including those that were previously unsuccessful, make those projects potentially more escalatory than others even when 
key individual decision makers change (Drummond, 1994).  Further examination of the organizational determinants of 
escalation may help explain repeating failure phenomena and thus holds similar promise for explaining cycles of escalation 
and withdrawal of commitment over time in large-scale IT projects.   
The examination of organizational determinants of escalation is virtually non-existent in the general escalation literature 
(Staw, 1997).  Most existing literature on the escalation of commitment to a failing course of action focuses on escalation as 
an individual decision.  Individual differences and determinants have an undoubtedly important affect on escalation of 
commitment (Whyte, Saks and Hook, 1997).  However, the almost exclusive orientation on individuals has produced a wide 
range of variables and theories regarding the causes of escalation, none of which are sufficiently explanatory (Staw, 1997).  
This bias is probably driven by the traditionally heavy focus of escalation research on experimental methods that focus on 
individuals.  It leads to the need for more studies focused on organizational-level explanations of escalating commitment.    
Linking to organizational research concepts like inertia and strategic momentum Meyer and Zucker (1989) posit that over 
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time self-reinforcing patterns of behavior emerge in organizations that supercede the role of individuals in the failure process.  
In situations where projects experience multiple cycles of escalating and de-escalating commitment, previously identified 
individual determinants of escalation take on different roles in redirected projects than they do in projects that escalate and 
are terminated or abandoned (Newman and Sabherwal, 1996; Drummond, 1994).  However, the long-term persistence of 
these factors and how they result in organizational determinants of escalation have not been carefully examined.   
Escalation Cycles in Public versus Private Organization 
Although the case selected is a U.S. government agency, evidence suggests that similar escalation behaviors exist 
internationally and in both government and business organizations (Keil, Tan, Wei, Saarinen, Tuunainen and Wassenaar, 
2000; Keil, Mann and Rai, 2000; Keil, et al., 1994-1995; Staw, 1981, Staw 1976).  The only other long-term longitudinal 
study of IT project escalation utilized a private sector case (Newman and Sabherwal, 1996).  However, there are differences 
in public versus private sector systems implementation (Rocheleau and Wu, 2002; Bozeman and Bretschneider, 1986). Thus 
while escalation of commitment may occur in both public and private organizations, due to differences in the IT project 
environment it may not unfold in the same way.  Meyer and Zucker (1989) posit that the motivation to terminate or alter 
existing courses of action tied to poor performance is lower in public organizations than private organizations.  This increases 
the likelihood of escalating commitment to failing courses of action in the public sector context.  In the absence of long-term 
studies of large-scale IT project escalation cycles in the public sector we can not confirm if the process by which escalation 
cycles emerge is the same or different from private sector organizations.  
RESEARCH APPROACH 
This research utilized an in-depth case study that allowed us to study the processes of escalation and de-escalation in a 
more natural setting.  An in-depth case study is an appropriate technique for an exploratory study of this nature where the 
focus is on theory-building (Benbasat, Goldstein, and Mead, 1987).  While future stages of this research will employ 
replication sampling to a greater number of cases, the current study concentrated on a single case of recurring failure with 
evidence of cyclical escalatory patterns.  We posit that the single in-depth case study selected contributes new understanding 
of the organizational determinants and processes involved in the escalation of large-scale IT projects.   
The IRS modernization effort is a good project to select for studying large-scale IT projects that fail.  The IRS is a 
particularly interesting example because the IRS is considered to be a very well-managed agency (Bozeman, 2002).  The IRS 
engaged in four distinct major attempts to modernize since the late 1960s, the first three of which clearly failed at a combined 
cost over US$4 billion:  the Tax Administration System Project from 1969 to 1977; the Service Center Replacement System 
and Tax Systems Redesign projects from 1978 to 1986; and the Tax Systems Modernization project from 1987 to 1997.  The 
fourth attempt, the Business Systems Modernization Project, began with the Blueprint Project around 1998 and is still 
underway with an estimated cost in excess of $10 billion (Varon, 2001).  The various iterations of the IRS modernization 
effort received wide-scale attention in the media, in oversight organizations, and within the agency itself.  The ease in 
acquiring longitudinal data on the project at a relatively low cost, and the nature of the IT project itself, made this an ideal 
case to study to learn more about escalation and de-escalation processes in large-scale IT projects.   
Our initial research question focused on understanding the nature of organizational determinants of escalating and 
withdrawing commitment in large-scale IT projects among government agencies.  We selected an initial set of “potentially 
important” variables from a set of existing escalation and de-escalation theories in an effort to understand if and how these 
variables persist over multiple cycles of escalation.  The purpose of selecting variables from multiple theories was to achieve 
Eisenhardt’s (1989:536) suggestion that in this type of exploratory research one try to come “as close as possible to the ideal 
of no theory under consideration and no hypotheses to test.”  We applied the initially selected variables to a collection of over 
750 historical documents, including audits, reports, memos, project documentation, media documents, congressional 
testimony and other studies.  The data analysis process adhered to the case study research procedures suggested by Yin 
(1994) and Eisenhardt (1989) using the grounded theory techniques compiled by Strauss and Corbin (1990).  It is from this 
stage that our findings began to emerge as we searched for patterns, or what Yin (1989:14) called a “chain of evidence,” 
among the variables over time.  From this analysis we observed several factors that persisted over time and contributed to 
repeating cycles of escalation and failure.   
CORE FINDINGS 
The IRS case provides new insight into the dynamics of commitment in large-scale IT projects.  These insights can be 
best explained by comparing them to the Centco case developed by Newman and Sabherwal (1996).  The key contribution of 
the Centco case was a process model of the repetitive escalation and withdrawal of commitment to failing IT projects over 
time.  Like Centco, the long time span covered by the IRS case allowed us to see persistent conditions in the organization that 
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continued despite changes among individual actors.  Indeed, the IRS Commissioner changed no fewer than 12 times over the 
modernization efforts.  The top IT leaders changed at least as frequently.  A more short-term study might have obscured our 
ability to see organizational determinants of commitment as separate from individual factors.  The IRS project went through 
multiple cycles of shifting commitment, including multiple terminations and redirections, and reconfirmed Newman and 
Sabherwal’s (1996) observations of this phenomenon.  Unlike the Centco case, the IRS modernization effort provides a 
situation where the decision to remain committed cannot be tied to any one individual or small set of individuals.  Therefore, 
looking at organizational conditions influencing the shifting commitment and the decisions to redirect were very helpful.  
Through the longitudinal and organizational focus of this study, we observed two capability gaps that emerged in the project 
at the organizational level:  a gap between required system capabilities and delivered system capabilities; and a gap between 
emerging project characteristics and existing project management and systems development capabilities.   
The Strategic Needs Gap 
Organizations are not going to engage in multi-year, multi-billion dollar IT initiatives without involving multiple people 
in the decision and having a clear strategic need.  The strategic need is defined by the performance gap that exists between (a) 
the system capabilities required for the organization to fulfill its mission and respond to emerging strategic issues, and (b) the 
ability of currently delivered system capabilities to meet the organizational requirements.  In the IRS case the required system 
capabilities are defined by the goals of modernization (faster access, current technology, better integrated information, 
automating inefficient processes) and emerging strategic issues facing the agency (desire to improve service to taxpayers, 
requirement to improve financial management, requirement to reduce the tax gap, and requirements to minimize 
opportunities for fraud and security violations).  In the IRS case we see that as the modernization efforts fail to significantly 
improve delivered capabilities the required capabilities do not remain stagnant.  In fact, while the fundamental goals remain 
the same, the emerging strategic issues facing the agency result in the system capabilities required by the organization to 
increase as well.   
 
Figure 1. The Strategic Needs Gap 
As the gap between delivered and required system capabilities grows (Gap A in Figure 1) organizational level 
commitment to undertaking a project increases.  The need to meet the required system capabilities leads to the initial 
organizational decision to commit to a large-scale IT project, as well as to subsequent decisions to commit to redirected 
projects.  Gap A has a direct affect on the emerging project characteristics of perceived project importance, project size and 
project complexity.  As Gap A grows, the perceived project importance increases, making it increasingly difficult for the 
organization to not make a commitment to redirect the project upon failure or withdraw commitment from a project in 
progress.  In the IRS case, as Gap A grew it created an environment where “failure is not an option.”  Such an environment is 
likely to influence the psychological factors associated with individual commitment, in addition to maintaining or escalating 
the organization’s commitment to a large-scale IT project.  As Gap A increases, the size and complexity of the project also 
increases.  These emerging project characteristics will further influence organizational level commitment when compared to 
development capabilities.   
The Development Capabilities Gap 
The second performance gap (Gap B) shown in Figure 2 represents the risk involved in a large-scale IT project.  The 
figure illustrates the difference between the size, complexity and importance of the project (emerging characteristics) as 
compared to the sophistication of the project management and system development capabilities of the organization.  The 
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existing project capabilities must meet or exceed the capabilities required to complete a project of a particular size and 
complexity.  If current project capabilities fall below that level, the risk to project success increases.  
 
Figure 2. The Development Capabilities Gap 
The persistence of Gap B throughout the lifespan of the IRS project has a direct effect on the likelihood that the project 
will succeed or fail, and influences both the escalation and de-escalation of the project in each cycle.  The smaller the gap, or 
the absence of a gap, would suggest that the organization has the project management and system development capabilities 
required to successfully complete a project of a given size, complexity and level of importance.  As the gap gets larger, the 
likelihood of failure increases.  In the IRS case the presence of Gap B translated into an inability to successfully control the 
modernization efforts.  Even as the IRS improved its development capabilities, the emerging project characteristics grew at a 
faster pace.  Indeed, in the fourth modernization cycle the IRS achieved its first substantive increase in project capabilities as 
the agency moved from CMM Level 1 to Level 2 early in the project.  This had a substantive impact on the agency’s ability 
to control the pace at which the organization became committed to new project components and improved the agency’s 
ability to withdraw commitment as components fell behind schedule and ran over budget.  However, by the fourth 
modernization cycle the project has grown to such a size, complexity and importance, that the improved project capabilities 
are still insufficient to keep the project from falling substantively behind schedule and over budget or warrant its removal 
from the GAO’s list of high-risk projects.   
Gap Evolution Over Time 
The two gaps are directly related to each other and influence the long-term escalation of organizational level 
commitment.  As Gap A increases, the emerging characteristics component of Gap B (project size, complexity and 
importance) also increases.  Similarly, the persistence of Gap B influences the organization’s ability to improve the delivered 
system capabilities in relation to the required capabilities.  As Gap B increases, it will be less able to improve upon the 
delivered capabilities and therefore, it will not be able to reduce the rate at which Gap A grows.  Because the two gaps have a 
positive direct relationship with one another, unless sufficient system capabilities can be delivered to reduce Gap A, or 
project capabilities can be sufficiently improved to reduce Gap B, the organization will likely become trapped in an unending 
cycle of re-escalating commitment.  Furthermore, one could expect that, as we see in the IRS case, as the two gaps grow the 
anticipated cost, schedule and organizational level commitment of resources required to successfully complete the project 
will increase with each new project cycle.   
INDICATIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
 This study contributes to our existing knowledge by looking for determinants of organizational level commitment to a 
failing course of action, which is a previously understudied area (Staw, 1997).  The IRS case provides an example where 
decisions to persist or commit were the result of collaborative decisions at the organizational level over long periods of time.  
The factors contributing to the two performance gaps identified play a critical role in shifting commitment at the 
organizational level as a large-scale IT project continues.  The findings from this study point to the need to conduct additional 
research that identifies other organizational determinants of escalating and withdrawing commitment and the associated 
processes by which organizations become committed to failing courses of action.  
The IRS case reconfirms that looking at large-scale IT projects over an extended period of time can yield new 
perspectives on escalation that have not been seen in shorter-term studies.  Further research should consider comparative 
longitudinal studies to control for conditions such as a high versus low degree of turnover among key executives, IT versus 
non-IT projects, project size and complexity, perceived project importance, and the sophistication of project management and 
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system development capabilities.  Through better understanding of the factors and processes involved with repeating cycles 
of escalating and withdrawing commitment, we may come to better understand escalation phenomena in general. 
One way in which this study differs from prior research is that it considers the effect of systems development capability 
on the escalation of commitment.  The IRS, while being a well-managed agency with experienced and quality managers, does 
not see its expertise and experience extend to its systems development capabilities.  Prior studies (Newman and Sabherwal, 
1996; Beath, 1991) suggest that further research is needed on the role of specific software development methodologies and 
their contribution to escalation of commitment.  The results of this study suggest that sophistication of an organization’s 
software development capabilities plays a direct role in the escalation of commitment.  Further research should consider both 
of these issues and examine the combination of software development methodologies used and the sophistication of the 
software development capabilities.   
INDICATIONS FOR PRACTICE 
The “high risk” series of projects monitored by the U.S. General Accounting Office quickly yields a list of troubled 
projects at a wide-range of government agencies.  The high rate of failure among large-scale IT projects results in significant 
financial losses for both public and private sector organizations.  In addition to financial losses, these failures can cause 
public relations problems and potentially threaten the survival of the organization.  The IRS case illustrates the importance of 
using good project management techniques and software development practices.  In early attempts at large-scale projects, 
organizations should focus on developing strong project management and systems development skills and experience to 
minimize their effect on escalation.  Because of the size of the prior lost investment and the increasing importance of strategic 
imperatives over time, managers of large-scale IT projects must be more aware of organizational drivers of escalating 
commitment in subsequent iterations of a project.  Awareness of these issues allows them to be managed and for project 
managers to employ de-escalation strategies and techniques at signs of trouble.  
This study highlights how important it is for managers of large-scale IT projects to be aware of the persistence of factors 
that may increase organizational-level commitment to a failing project.  Many of the problems and the degree of escalation 
encountered at the IRS might have been overcome if issues presented by Gap B were resolved sooner.  Managers of large-
scale projects should carefully consider alternatives to achieving strategic imperatives and the consequences of not achieving 
those imperatives.  If the project fails and the strategic imperatives remain, what will be the effect on the future of the project 
and the future of the organization?  At a minimum, this research suggests that the likelihood of escalation in the next iteration 
is very high if not inevitable unless managers find a way to manage the consequences of the two identified gaps.   
SUMMARY OBSERVATIONS 
This study represents a contribution to research in that it explores new ground related to information systems 
implementation.  The most significant contribution is the empirical evidence of organizational determinants of escalating and 
withdrawing commitment.  Such organizational determinants are more likely to be present in large-scale IT projects which by 
their size, complexity and importance will likely require the decision to proceed be made by a larger organizational 
contingent rather than an individual decision maker or small group of decision makers.  In addition, given the increased 
likelihood that IT projects will escalate in general, evidence that large-scale projects may escalate repeatedly opens a range of 
interesting questions with implications for escalation theory, knowledge management and large-scale systems 
implementation.  This study extends prior research in each of these directions.  In doing so, the existing research streams in 
this area are both supported and extended to reconfirm prior observations of repeating cycles of escalating and withdrawing 
commitment and to introduce new avenues of inquiry on these phenomena.   
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